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It is hardly surprising that with his book The Morality of Consent 
Alexander M. Bickel moved from constitutional scholarship into 
explicit political philosophy. That would seem a natural, indeed 
almost an inevitable, progression for scholars of the Constitution. 
The wonder is less that Bickel developed in that way than that 
so many academic scholars of the Constitution do not. There is, 
of course, political feeling implicit in much constitutional writing, 
but too often it is disguised as legal analysis; it colors and distorts 
constitutional judgment rather than informing it. 
This book, published posthumously, was Bickel's first foray into 
the realm of political philosophy. He came equipped, as the book 
makes evident again and again, with the intellectual apparatus of 
a profound lawyer as well as the historical learning that earned him 
an appointment at Yale as Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and 
Legal History, and an ease with political science that could easily 
have qualified him for a chair in that department as well. 
The Morality of Consent needs to be seen in perspective. It is 
not a definitive work; it is not the full statement of Alex Bickel's 
political thinking. It was intended as a ranging shot in the task Bickel 
had set for himself: the reconstitution of a conservative intellectual 
tradition in this country. He was not entirely satisfied with the 
label "conservative." Although he applies it to himself here, at 
various points in the book he modifies it by referring to his views 
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as "Whig in the English eighteenth-century sense." And he also 
claims, rightly, that it is he, rather than those whose thought he 
opposes, who is entitled to the name of "liberal," by which he 
meant liberal in the classical, European sense. The effort to find an 
appropriate label is confusing. Some idea of what Bickel meant 
may be gleaned from the fact that he thought The Federalist an 
example of the best American conservative thought, as Edmund 
Burke was of the English variety. In this sense, Bickel's conserva- 
tism was a habit of mind and a quality of spirit that rejected the 
doctrinaire, the derivation of conclusions about a highly complex, 
somewhat irrational, flesh-and-blood world from large abstractions 
and grand principles. He displayed instead the qualities of thought- 
fulness about experience, prudence, modesty of ambition for politi- 
cal solutions to problems, respect for established values and insti- 
tutions. He quotes approvingly from Burke concerning abstract 
theories of individual rights: "distinctions of rights . . . these meta- 
physical distinctions; I hate the very sound of them." 
The distinction between those who reason from experience and 
those who reason from abstract principle, and the serious dangers 
posed by the latter, is a major theme of this book. Indeed, it opens 
with the observation: "Two diverging traditions in the mainstream 
of Western political thought-one 'liberal,' the other 'conservative' 
-have competed, and still compete, for control of the democratic 
process and of the American constitutional system . . ." The lib- 
eral tradition or model is "contractarian" and "rests on a vision of 
individual rights that have a clearly defined, independent existence 
predating society and are derived from nature and from a natural, 
if imagined, contract. . . . The Whig [or conservative] model, 
on the other hand, begins not with theoretical rights but with 
a real society, whose origins in the historical mists it acknowledges 
to be mysterious. The Whig model assesses human nature as it is 
seen to be." 
These days the contractarian model is having all the best of it, 
particularly in the academic world. Bickel alludes to some examples 
of that tradition but does not take direct, specific issue with those 
writers here, as undoubtedly he would have been required to do 
had he lived to develop the intellectual foundations of his own 
position. This book is not an explicit attack upon the premises of 
contractarianism. It is an excellent example of the opposed mode 
of argument, and it does suggest why contractarianism is to be 
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feared: "It is moral, principled, legalistic, ultimately authoritarian." 
In our time, it is also egalitarian, a fact that, Alex Bickel thought, 
poses special danger for freedom and safety in society. Egalitarian- 
ism requires not only an equal chance in social and political pro- 
cesses but equal results obtained from those processes. That in turn 
requires that the state control institutions once thought of as 
private, as areas for the play of individual and group initiatives, 
in order to ensure that they produce equality of outcomes. Of 
necessity, this effort expands the state enormously and drains the 
strength of centers of private power so that the individual is with- 
out buffer institutions that deflect and moderate the direct power 
of the state. The upshot will not be equality; it may, both Alex 
Bickel and Edmund Burke warn, be tyranny. 
There is too much richness of insight in this book for summary 
in brief compass. The book does not accomplish the restoration of 
a conservative intellectual tradition-Bickel knew that to be a work 
of enormous magnitude-but it is a noteworthy first step. He 
succeeds in setting much of the framework in place and in display- 
ing the mode of thought appropriate to that tradition. It is hard 
to believe the work will not prove seminal, that the tradition will 
not be elaborated by others. 
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